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The paper is concerned with counterparty credit risk management for credit default
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Credit Value Adjustment) of (Brigo et al. 2012) and on the performance of various col-
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1. Introduction
The distress of many financial firms in recent years made counterparty risk manage-
ment for OTC derivatives such as credit default swaps (abbreviated CDS) an issue
of high concern in financial risk management. Crucial tasks in that context are the
computation of credit value adjustments that account for the possibility that one
of the contracting parties defaults before the maturity of the OTC contract, and
the mitigation of counterparty risk by collateralization. Collateralization refers to
the practice of posting securities (the so-called collateral) that serve as a pledge for
the collateral taker. These securities are liquidated if one of the contracting parties
defaults before maturity, and the proceeds are used to cover the replacement cost of
the contract. In order to ensure that the funds generated in this way are sufficient,
the collateral position needs to be adjusted dynamically in reaction to changes in
the value of the underlying derivative security. The price dynamics of that security
thus play a crucial role for the performance of a given collateralization strategy.
In the present paper we study the impact of different price dynamics on the
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size of value adjustments and on the performance of collateralization strategies for
credit default swaps. We are particularly interested in the influence of contagion.
Contagion effects - the fact that the default of a firm leads to a sudden increase
in the credit spread of surviving firms - are frequently observed on real markets;
a prime example are the events that surrounded the default of Lehman Brothers
in 2008. To see that contagion might be relevant for the performance of collateral-
ization strategies consider the scenario where the protection seller defaults during
the runtime of the CDS. In that case contagion might lead to a substantial increase
in the credit spread of the reference entity (the firm on which the CDS is written)
and hence in turn to a much higher replacement value for the CDS. In standard
collateralization strategies this is taken into account at most in a very crude way,
and the amount of collateral posted before the default might be insufficient for re-
placing the CDS. In our view this issue merits a detailed analysis in the context of
dynamic portfolio credit risk models.
We use the reduced-form credit risk model proposed by Frey and Schmidt (2012)
as vehicle for our analysis. In that model it is assumed that the default times of
the reference entity, the protection seller and the protection buyer are conditionally
independent given some finite state Markov chain X that models the economic
environment. We consider two versions of the model which differ with respect to
the information that is available for investors. In the full-information model it is
assumed that X is observable and there are no contagion effects. In the incomplete-
information version of the model investors observe the chain X in additive Gaussian
noise and moreover the default history. In that case there is default contagion that
is caused by the updating of the conditional distribution of Xt at default events.
An advantage of the setup of Frey and Schmidt (2012) for our purposes is the fact
that the the joint distribution of the default times is the same in the two versions of
the model. Hence differences in the size of value adjustments or in the performance
of collateralization strategies can be attributed to the different dynamics of credit
spreads (contagion or no contagion) in the two model variants.
In order to compute value adjustments and to measure the performance of col-
lateralization strategies we use the bilateral collateralized credit value adjustment
(BCCVA) proposed by Brigo et al. (2012). This credit value adjustment accounts
for the form of collateralization strategies and for the credit quality of the contract-
ing parties. Our analysis reveals that the impact of contagion on the size of the
BCCVA depends strongly on the relative credit quality of the three parties involved
and is hard to predict up front. Results on the performance of different collater-
alization strategies are more clear-cut: we show that while standard market-value
based collateralization strategies provide a good protection against losses due to
counterparty risk in the full-information setup, they have problems to deal with the
contagious jump in credit spreads at a default of the protection seller. Motivated
by these findings we go on and develop an improved collateralization strategy that
performs well in the presence of contagion. For our analysis we need to compute
the BCCVA in both model variants. Here use the theory of phase-type distributions
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to derive new explicit formulas for the BCCVA under full information; this is the
main mathematical contribution of the paper.
There is by now a large literature on counterparty risk for CDSs. Existing con-
tributions focus mostly on the computation of value adjustments (with and without
collateralization) in various credit risk models. Counterparty credit risk and valu-
ation adjustments for uncollateralized CDS are studied by Hull and White (2001),
Brigo and Chourdakis (2009), Blanchet-Scalliet and Patras (2008), Lipton and Sepp
(2009) and Bao et al. (2010), among others. Counterparty credit risk for collater-
alized CDS is discussed in Bielecki et al. (2011), Fujii and Takahashi (2011) and
Brigo et al. (2012).
However, none of these contributions covers the issues discussed in this paper in
full. Bielecki et al. (2011) analyze the impact of collateralization on counterparty risk
in CDS contracts using the Markov copula model which does not exhibit contagion
effects whereas Fujii and Takahashi (2011) is essentially concerned with the impact
of collateralization on the price of a CDS that is subject to counterparty risk.
Brigo et al. (2012) is closest to our contribution: these authors study the impact
of contagion on credit value adjustments and on the effectiveness of market-value
based collateralization strategies in a Gaussian copula model with stochastic credit
spreads. In that model default or event correlation and contagion effects are both
driven by the choice of the correlation parameter of the copula. Consequently, it is
not possible to disentangle the impact of event correlation and of default contagion
on credit value adjustments and on the performance of collateralization strategies.
This might be an advantage of our setup. Moreover, Brigo et al. (2012) do not
address the issue of designing collateralization strategies that take default contagion
into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we
discuss the BCCVA of Brigo et al. (2012). In Section 3 we introduce the credit risk
model of Frey and Schmidt (2012) that provides the framework for the analysis of
the present paper. Section 4 is devoted to the computation of the BCCVA in both
model variants. In Section 5 we discuss different collateralization strategies, and in
Section 6 we present the results of a simulation study.
2. Bilateral Collateralized Credit Value Adjustment
In this section we discuss the bilateral collateralized credit value adjustment
(BCCVA) proposed in Brigo et al. (2012). We begin with some notation. Through-
out the entire paper we work on a probability space (Ω,F ,Q) equipped with a fil-
tration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] that fulfills the usual hypotheses. Q denotes the risk-neutral
measure used for pricing, and all expectations are taken with respect to Q. The
filtration F contains the information, which is available to the market participants
and will be specified later when the model framework is discussed. Moreover, we
assume that interest rates are constant and equal to r and we denote the discount
factor from time t to time s by D(t, s) = e−r(t−s).
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The following parties are involved in the CDS contract: the protection buyer,
labeled B; the reference identity, labeled R; the protection seller, labeled S. The
default times of these entities are denoted by τB , τR and τS . We assume that defaults
are observable so that τB , τR and τS are F stopping times. The first default time
is denoted by τ , that is τ := τB ∧ τR ∧ τS . The random variable ξ with values in
the set {B,R, S} represents the identity of the firm defaulting at τ . Furthermore
let RecB , RecR, RecS denote the recovery rate and LGDB , LGDR, LGDS the loss
given default of of B, R and S. We assume that recovery rates are constant.
All valuations and cash flows are defined from the perspective of the protection
buyer. Therefore positive numbers are used to indicate that a cash flow is received
by the protection buyer and negative numbers to indicate that a cash flow is received
by the protection seller.
Payments of a risk-free CDS. In our context a CDS without counterparty risk,
which we call (counterparty-) risk-free CDS, is a CDS where neither the protection
seller nor the protection buyer are subject to default risk. For simplicity, we assume
that the premium payments are paid continuously. Therefore the sum of all dis-
counted payments in a risk-free CDS from time t to time s discounted to t, denoted
by Π(t, s) is given by:
Π(t, s) := 1{t<τR≤s} LGDRD(t, τR)−
∫ s
t
SRD(t, u)1{τR>u}du. (2.1)
Here SR represents the spread of the CDS. In addition we define the price at time
t Pt of a risk-free CDS with maturity date T > t as the risk-neutral expectation of
Π(t, T ), that is
Pt := E (Π(t, T )|Ft) .
Risky CDS and collateralization. In a CDS with counterparty risk, called risky
CDS below, the protection buyer or the protection seller might default before the
maturity of the CDS. Collateralization is a way to limit the potential loss for the
surviving party. The details of the collateralization procedure are stipulated in the
credit support annex (CSA) of the contract. A simplified version of the procedure
works as follows. At t0 = 0 a collateral account is opened. Let Ct denote the cash
balancea in the account at time t, where Ct > 0 (Ct < 0) means that the protection
seller (the protection buyer) has posted the collateral and that the protection buyer
(the protection seller) is the collateral taker. The collateral taker has unrestricted
access to the posted collateral. The collateral is updated at discrete time points t0,
t1, . . . , tN = T that are specified in the CSA. At t1 the collateral taker pays interest
on the collateral and the collateral amount is updated in reaction to changes in the
price of the underlying CDS over (t0, t1] as stipulated in the CSA. This procedure
aIn this paper we assume that the collateral is posted in form of cash and not in form of other
assets.
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continues up to the maturity of the CDS or until the first default occurs. If τ > T
or if τ < T and ξ = R the collateral account is closed at the ‘natural end’ of the
contract so that Ct ≡ 0 for t ≥ τ ∧ T in that case. If there is an early default of B
or S, that is for τ ≤ T and ξ ∈ {B,S}, the collateral is used to reduce the exposure
of the collateral taker and any remaining collateral is returned; details are given
below.
An issue arising in this context is re-hypothecation: since the collateral taker
has unrestricted access to the posted collateral it may happen that a part of the
collateral is lost as a consequence of the default event. We denote by Rec′B and
Rec′S the recovery rate for the return of collateral and by LGD
′
B and LGD
′
S the
corresponding loss given default (assumed constant). Usually the return of collateral
is favored to other claims in bankruptcy procedures, so that RecB ≤ Rec′B and
RecS ≤ Rec′S . Contracts without re-hypothecation are characterized by Rec′B = 1
and Rec′S = 1.
Formally, we model the cash balance in the collateral account at time t by some
adapted RCLL process C = (Ct)0≤t≤T (the collateralization strategy). For simplic-
ity we assume that interest on the collateral amount is paid continuously. Hence
from the perspective of the protection buyer collateralization leads to a cumula-
tive cash flow stream of the form Ct −
∫ t
0
rCsds, t ≤ T . By partial integration the
discounted value of that cash-flow stream at t = 0 equals
ΠC(0, T ) = C0+
∫ T
0
e−rsdDs =
∫ T
0
e−rsdCs+
∫ T
0
−re−rsCsds = e−rTCT . (2.2)
Recall that CT = 0 on {τ > T} and on {τ < T} ∩ {ξ = R}. Hence scenarios where
the CDS ends naturally can be ignored in the computation of the counterparty
risk, and it suffices to consider the collateral payments for the case where there is
an early default of R or S. Note that in this argument we have used the risk-free
rate r for discounting the cash-flow stream D, thus ignoring the funding cost of the
collateral. We think that this simplification can be justified as funding costs are not
central to the objectives of this paper. For an analysis of credit value adjustments
in the presence of funding cost we refer to Brigo et al. (2011b), Crepey (2012a) and
Crepey (2012b).
Payments at an early default. In order to complete the description of the cash
flow stream of a risky CDS we need to specify the payments at an early default
of B or S, that is for τ ≤ T and ξ ∈ {B,S}. In that case the surviving party is
allowed to charge a close-out amount from the defaulting one. According to the
ISDA Master Agreement the close-out amount is defined as the reasonable amount
of money which is needed to close the position. In this paper we assume that the
close-out amount is given by Pτ , the value of the risk-free CDS at the first default
time. Note that this choice means that the credit quality of the surviving party
is completely neglected in the computation of the close-out amount, which is in
line with current market practice. However, there are alternative suggestions in the
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literature; see for instance Brigo et al. (2012a).
We continue with the description of the payments at an early default. To shorten
the exposition we concentrate on the payments in the case where the protection
seller defaults first. Note that no additional collateral is posted after the default of
S. Hence we assume that the amount of collateral available during the bankruptcy
process is given by Cτ− (the amount of collateral that has been posted immediately
prior to τ). This distinction matters if the close-out amount Pt jumps at t = τ , for
instance due to contagion effects.
We have to consider four scenarios that differ with respect to the sign of Pτ and
of Cτ−.
(1) Suppose that Pτ > 0 and that the protection buyer is the collateral taker, that
is Cτ− > 0. The collateral is used to reduce the loss of the protection buyer. If
Cτ− exceeds Pτ , the excess collateral is returned to the protection seller. If Cτ−
is smaller than Pτ , the protection buyer claims the difference Pτ − Cτ− from
S. However, B will receive only a recovery payment of size RecS(Pτ − Cτ−) in
that case. With the notation X+ := max(X, 0) and X− := −min(X, 0),b the
overall payment at τ takes the form:
1{τ<T}1{ξ=S}1{Pτ>0}1{Cτ−>0}
(
RecS(Pτ − Cτ−)+ − (Pτ − Cτ−)−
)
.
(2) Consider the case when Pτ > 0 and Cτ− < 0, so that the protection seller
is the collateral taker. In this situation B is entitled to the repayment of the
collateral and to the close-out amount Pτ . However, only a fraction of Pτ and,
due to re-hypothecation, of Cτ− will be paid to B. Hence the overall payment
takes the form
1{τ<T}1{ξ=S}1{Pτ>0}1{Cτ−<0}
(
RecS Pτ − Rec′S Cτ−
)
.
(3) Suppose that Pτ < 0 and that the protection buyer is the collateral taker, that
is Cτ− > 0. In that case B pays S the close-out amount Pτ and he returns the
collateral. Hence from the viewpoint of B, the overall payment equals
1{τ<T}1{ξ=S}1{Pτ<0}1{Cτ−>0}
(
Pτ − Cτ−
)
.
(4) Suppose that Pτ < 0 and that B posted some collateral so that Cτ− < 0. If
−Cτ− ≤ −Pτ S keeps the collateral and he moreover receives the difference
−(Pτ −Cτ ). Otherwise the excess collateral has to be returned to B, and there
might be losses due to re-hypothecation. Hence the overall payment in that case
equals
1{τ<T}1{ξ=S}1{Pτ<0}1{Cτ−<0}
(
Rec′S(Pτ − Cτ−)+ − (Pτ − Cτ−)−
)
.
The payments that arise if the protection buyer defaults first, that is for ξ = B, can
be described in an analogous manner.
bNote that the convention X− := min(X, 0) is used in Brigo et al. (2011a) and Brigo et al. (2012).
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The BCCVA. Given a collateralization strategy C, the bilateral collateralized
credit value adjustment (BCCVA) is defined as difference of the discounted cash-
flow stream of the risk-free and the risky CDS. Following Brigo et al. (2012), we
denote the latter cash-flow stream by ΠD(t, T, C). We thus have
BCCVA(t, T, C) := E (Π(t, T )|Ft)− E
(
ΠD(t, T, C)
∣∣Ft) . (2.3)
Using the above description of the payments at an early default it is straightfor-
ward to give an explicit formula for ΠD(t, T, C). However, in this paper we use an
expression for the BCCVA that does not involve ΠD directly (see Proposition 2.1
below) so that we omit the formula and refer to Brigo et al. (2012) instead.
By definition the BCCVA thus measures the difference in value of the cash-flows
of a risk-free CDS and a risky CDS. Note that the BCCVA takes the risk of a default
of S and of B into account. The BCCVA leads to symmetrical prices in the sense
that the adjustment computed from the point of view of the protection buyer equals
(with the opposite sign) the adjustment computed from the point of view of the
protection seller.
In the sequel we work with the following representation of the BCCVA that is
established in Brigo et al. (2012).
Proposition 2.1. The BCCVA can be decomposed as follows
BCCVA(t, T, C) = CCVA(t, T, C)− CDVA(t, T, C), (2.4)
where the collateralized credit value adjustment (CCVA) and the collateralized debt
value adjustment (CDVA) are given by:
CCVA(t, T, C) := E
(
1{τ<T}1{ξ=S}D(t, τ) (LGDS(P+τ − C+τ−)+
+LGD′S(C
−
τ− − P−τ )+)|Ft
)
CDVA(t, T, C) := E
(
1{τ<T}1{ξ=B}D(t, τ) (LGDB(C
−
τ− − P−τ )−
+LGD′B(P
+
τ − C+τ−)−)|Ft
)
.
Comments. 1. The CCVA reflects the possible loss for B due to an early default
of S, whereas the CDVA reflects the loss of S due to an early default of B. Consider
for instance the case where S defaults first. If Pτ > 0, there are two reasons why
B might incur a loss: first, the collateral posted by S might be insufficient to cover
the close-out amount of the CDS, which leads to a loss of size LGDS(Pτ − C+τ−)+;
if Cτ− < 0 there is moreover a loss due to re-hypothecation of size LGD′S C
−
τ−.
The overall loss thus corresponds to the argument of the CCVA-formula above as
P−τ = 0 for Pτ > 0. If Pτ < 0, B incurs a loss of size LGD
′
S(C
−
τ− − P−τ ) (the loss
of the excess collateral caused by re-hypothecation). Again this corresponds to the
argument of the CCVA-formula in that case.
2. Without collateralization, that is for Ct ≡ 0, the CCVA and the CDVA take
the form of options on the risk-free CDS price P with strike price K = 0 and
random maturity date τ .
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3. The Model
Next we give a mathematical description of the model framework we use in the
remainder of this paper. We consider a reduced-form model where τR, τB and τS
are conditionally independent, doubly-stochastic random times whose default in-
tensity is driven by a finite-state Markov chain X = (Xt)t≥0 with state space
SX = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, generator matrix W = (wij)1≤i,j≤K and initial distribu-
tion described by the probability vector π0 with π
k
0 = Q(X0 = k). Denote by
FXt := σ(Xs : s ≤ t) the filtration generated by X. We assume that for all time
points t1, t2, t3 > 0 one has
Q(τR > t1, τB > t2, τS > t3 | FX∞) =
∏
i∈{B,R,S}
exp
(
−
∫ ti
0
λi(Xs)ds
)
(3.1)
where λi : S
X → R+, i ∈ {B,R, S}, are deterministic functions. We introduce the
survival indicator functions HBt := 1{τB>t}, H
R
t := 1{τR>t} and H
S
t := 1{τS>t}
and we put H := (HB , HR, HS) and FHt = σ(Hs : s ≤ t). Moreover, we assume
that the underlying probability space (Ω,F ,Q) supports a d-dimensional standard
Brownian motionW which is independent of X and H;W is used to model investor
information under imperfect observation of X (see below). The interpretation of
this framework is easiest if λB(·), λR(·) and λS(·) are increasing in x. In that case
the Markov chain X can be viewed as abstract representation of the state of the
economy, 1 being the best state (low default probability of all firms) and K the
worst state (high default probability of all firms).
In the sequel we will consider two variants of the model that differ with respect
to the assumptions made on investor information.
The full-information case. Here it is assumed that X is observable for investors
and we take F = FO with
FO = FH ∨ FX ∨ FW .
(The inclusion of FW is purely technical and has no impact on the prices of credit
derivatives under full information). It is well-known that for time points tR, tS , tB >
t the conditional survival function given the investor information at time t satisfies
Q(τR > tR, τB > tB , τS > tS | FOt ) =
∏
i∈{B,R,S}
Hit E
(
exp
(
−
∫ ti
t
λi(Xs)ds
)
| Xt
)
.
(3.2)
Moreover, the process λi(Xt), i ∈ {B,R.S} is the FO default intensity of τi, and
the pair process (X,H) is Markov. A derivation of these results can be found in
Chapter 9 of McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005), among others. Formula (3.2)
implies in particular that prior to the default of R the price of the risk-free CDS is
a function of t and Xt,
POt = E
(
Π(t, T )
∣∣FOt ) = pO(t,Xt).
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An explicit formula for the function pO is given Section 4.1 below.
The incomplete-information case. This variant of the model has been stud-
ied in detail in Frey and Schmidt (2012). In that paper it is assumed that X is
unobservable and that investors are confined to a noisy signal of X of the form
Zt :=
∫ t
0
a(Xs)ds+Wt ,
where a : SX → Rd is a deterministic function. Hence we put F = FU with FU =
FH ∨ FZ . Note that FU ⊂ FO by construction. Define the conditional probabilities
πkt := Q(Xt = k | FUt ), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and let πt := (π1t , . . . , πKt )⊤. (3.3)
As shown in Frey and Schmidt (2012), the process (πt)0≤t≤T is the natural state
variable process for the model under incomplete information. The reasons are the
following: first, it is well-known that the intensity of Hi with respect to the sub-
filtration FU is given by the projection of the intensity on FU (see Chapter 2 of
Bremaud (1981)), so that the FU -default intensities are given by
λ̂i(Xt) := E
(
λi(Xt)
∣∣FUt ) = K∑
k=1
λi(k)π
k
t i ∈ {R,B, S}. (3.4)
Second, for τR > t the price P
U
t of a risk-free CDS can be expressed as a function
of πt. By iterated conditional expectations,
PUt := E
(
Π(t, T )
∣∣FUt ) = E (E (Π(t, T )∣∣FOt )∣∣FUt ) = ∑
k∈SX
p(t, k)πkt . (3.5)
Finally, the dynamics of πt can be described by a K-dimensional SDE system; see
Proposition 4.1 below. From this SDE system we may in particular derive an explicit
formula for the contagion effects under incomplete information.
In the practical application of the model the process Z is considered as abstract
source of information and the current value of π is calibrated from observed prices
of traded credit derivatives; see Section 6.1 below.
Note that in both model variants the unconditional joint survival function of
τR, τB and τS is given by
Q(τR > tR, τB > tB , τS > tS) = E
( ∏
i∈{B,R,S}
exp
(
−
∫ ti
0
λi(Xs)ds
))
,
so that the distributions of (τB , τR, τS) coincides in both versions of the model.
Therefore any differences in the BCCVA or in the performance of collateralization
strategies can be attributed to the different dynamics of CDS spreads. For illustra-
tive purposes we plot typical trajectories of CDS spreads in Figure 5
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4. Computation of the BCCVA
4.1. The case of the full-information model
In order to evaluate the BCCVA-formula (2.4) we need to determine the joint dis-
tribution of τ , ξ and Xτ . This is done in Theorem 4.1 below. The proof of this
result relies on the observation that the distribution of the triple (τ, ξ,Xτ ) can be
expressed as first entry time of the Markov chains (X,HR) and (X,H) into specific
setsc. In order to give precise results, we need to specify the generators of these
Markov chains.
We assume that the states are ordered in the inverse lexicographic order. Ac-
cording to this order a vector (x1, . . . , xn) is smaller than (y1, . . . , yn) if xn < yn or
if there is some k < n with xl+1 = yl+1 for l ∈ {k, . . . , n − 1} and with xk < yk.
For example, in the case K = 2 the states of the process (X,HR) are ordered in
the following way:
(1, 0) < (2, 0) < (1, 1) < (2, 1).
The transition rate qy,z of (X,H
R) from a state y = (y1, y2) to the state z = (z1, z2)
is given by:
qy,z =

wy1 z1 if y1 6= z1 and y2 = z2
λR(y1) if y1 = z1, y2 = 0 and z2 = 1
0 otherwise.
Hence the generator of the process (X,HR) can be represented by the matrix
Q :=
(
W − ΛR ΛR
0 W
)
.
Here ΛR = diag(λR(1), . . . , λR(K)) denotes a diagonal matrix with entries on the
main diagonal given by the elements of the vector λR. The transition rates and the
generator of (X,H) can be determined by analogous considerations.
Theorem 4.1. Let t < s and k ∈ SX . Then the following statements hold:
(a) The distribution of τi with i ∈ {B,R, S} is given by
Q
(
τi ≤ s
∣∣Xt = k,Hit = 0) = 1{τi>t} (1− e⊤k eQi(s−t)1K) .
Here Qi := W − Λi where Λi = diag(λi(1), . . . , λi(K)), 1K = (1, . . . , 1)⊤ is a
column vector of dimension K and el denotes the lth unit vector in RK .
(b) The distribution of the first-to-default time τ can be computed as:
Q (τ ≤ s|Xt = k,Ht = 0) = 1{τ>t}
(
1− e⊤k eQ(1)(s−t)1K
)
,
where we defined Q(1) :=W −
∑
j∈{B,R,S} Λj.
cDistributions which can be represented as the first-entry time of a finite state Markov chain are
known as phase-type distributions. They have been used in credit risk before; see for instance
Herbertsson (2011)
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(c) The probability that obliger i ∈ {B,R, S} defaults first and before time s is:
Q (τi ≤ s, ξ = i|Xt = k,Ht = 0) = 1{τi>t}e⊤k Q−1(1)
(
eQ(1)(s−t) − I
)
Λi1K .
Here Q−1(1) is the inverse of Q(1).
(d) The probability that obliger i ∈ {B,R, S} defaults first and that at default the
Markov chain is in the state l equals
Q (Xτ = l, τi ≤ s, ξ = i|Xt = k,Ht = 0) = 1{τi>t}e⊤k Q−1(1)
(
eQ(1)(s−t) − I
)
Λiel.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 4.1 (Risk-free CDS price under full-information). The price POt
of a risk-free CDS on the reference entity at time t given that Xt = l and τR > t is
equal to 1{τR>t}p
O(t, l), where the function pO : [0, T ]× SX → R is given by
pO(t, l) =
(−LGDR e⊤l QR − Se⊤l ) (QR − rI)−1 (e(QR−rI)(T−t) − I)1K .
Moreover, the price of a CDS at t = 0 is
PO0 =
(−LGDR π⊤0 QR − Sπ⊤0 ) (QR − rI)−1 (e(QR−rI)(T−t) − I)1K .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Below we will see that for a suitable function g : [0, T ]×SX → R, collateralization
strategies of the form Ct = g(t,Xt) are optimal in the full-information model. For
a generic strategy of this form Theorem 4.1(d) gives the following nearly explicit
formula for the BCCVA.
Corollary 4.2 (BCCVA formula under full information). Assume that for
t < τ the collateralization strategy is of the form Ct = g(t,Xt). Then, given Xt = j,
the CCVA and CDVA are given by:
CCVAt =
∑
k∈{1,...,K}
∫ T
t
D(t, s)
(
LGDS
(
pO(s, k)+ − g(s, k)+)+
+ LGD′S
(
g(s, k)− − pO(s, k)−)+) fSj,k(s)ds
CDVAt =
∑
k∈{1,...,K}
∫ T
t
D(t, s)
(
LGDB
(
g(s, k)− − p(s, k)−)−
+ LGD′B
(
p(s, k)+ − g(s, k)+)−) fBj,k(s)ds, .
Here the functions f ij,k, i ∈ {B,S}, are given by
f ij,k(s) :=
d
ds
Q(τ ≤ s, ξ = i,Xτ = k | Xt = k,Ht = 0) = 1{τi>t}e⊤j eQ(1)(s−t)Λiek.
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Since default correlations enter in the calibration of the model we end this section
by a closed-form solution for default correlations evaluated at time t = 0. Formally
̺Ti,j , the default correlation of firm i and j, is given by
̺Ti,j := corr(1{τi≤T}, 1{τj≤T}) =
−pTi pTj√
pTi (1− pTi )pTj (1− pTj )
,
where pTi = Q (τi ≤ T ), pTj := Q (τj ≤ T ) and pTi,j := Q (τi ≤ T, τj ≤ T ). Applying
Theorem 4.1(a) and (b) gives
Corollary 4.3 (Default correlation). For i 6= j ̺Ti,j is given by
̺Ti,j =
π0(e
(W−Λi−Λj)T )1K − 1 + pTi + pTj − pTi pTj√
pTi (1− pTi )pTj .(1− pTj )
.
4.2. The BCCVA in the incomplete-information model
In this section we discuss the computation of the BCCVA under incomplete infor-
mation. We begin with a formula for the risk-free CDS price. By combining (3.5)
and Corollary 4.1 we obtain
Corollary 4.4 (risk-free CDS prices under incomplete information). Given
that {τR > t} the value PUt of a risk-free CDS at time t equals
PUt = p
U (t, πt) :=
(−LGDR π⊤t QR − Sπ⊤t ) (QR − rI)−1 (e(QR−rI)(T−t) − I)1K .
Note that for t = 0 one has PO0 = P
U
0 ; this equality reflects of course the fact
that the unconditional distributions of the default times coincide in the two model
variants.
Under incomplete information the BCCVA is essentially the value of a portfolio
of options on the price PU of the risk-free CDS. Since PUt is a function of πt, in order
to compute the BCCVA one thus needs the form of the dynamics of the process
π, and we now recall the relevant results from Frey and Schmidt (2012). We begin
with some notation. We denote the optional projection of a process G = (Gt)t∈[0,T ]
with respect to FU by Ĝ so that Ĝt = E
(
Gt
∣∣FUt ). In particular,
λ̂t,i = E
(
λi(Xt)
∣∣FUt ) = K∑
j=1
λi(j)π
j
t .
ât = E
(
a(Xt)
∣∣FUt ) = K∑
j=1
a(j)πjt
Using the Levy-characterization of Brownian motion it is easily seen that
µt = (µ
1
t , . . . , µ
d
t ) with µ
i
t = Z
i
t −
∫ t
0
â(Xs)ds
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is a FU -Brownian motion. Moreover, it is well-known that λ̂t,i is the FU default
intensity of firm i.
Proposition 4.1 (Kushner-Stratonovich-equation). The process π is the
unique solution of the K-dimensional SDE system
dπkt =
K∑
i=1
wikπ
i
tdt+
∑
j∈{R,B,S}
(
γkj (πt−)
)⊤
d
(
Hjt + (1−Hjt )λ̂t,jdt
)
+
(
αk(πt)
)⊤
dµt ,
k = 1, . . . ,K, where
γkj (πt) = π
k
t
(
λj(k)∑K
i=1 λj(i)π
i
t
− 1
)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ K and
αk(πt) = π
k
t
(
a(k)−
K∑
i=1
πita(i)
)
.
The proposition shows that the process π exhibits jump-diffusion dynamics. In
particular, π jumps at default times and the jump height of πkt at the default of
firm j is equal to γkj (πτj−).
Using the proposition we can moreover compute the size of the information-
induced contagion effects: the jump in the FU -default intensity of firm i at the
default of firm j equals
λ̂τj ,i − λ̂τj−,i =
K∑
k=1
λi(k)π
k
τj−
(
λj(k)∑K
l=1 λj(l)π
l
τj−
− 1
)
=
covpiτj−(λi, λj)
Epiτj−(λj)
, j 6= i.(4 1)
An inspection of this formula shows the following.
• Contagion effects are inversely proportional to the instantaneous default risk of
the defaulting entity (firm j): a default of an entity with a better credit quality
comes as a bigger surprise and the market impact is larger.
• Contagion effects are proportional to the covariance of the default intensities
λi(·) and λj(·) under the ‘a-priori distribution’ πτj−. In particular, contagion
effects are relatively high if the firms have similar characteristics in the sense
that the functions λi(·) and λj(·) are (almost) linearly dependent.
Proposition 4.1 indicates a method to simulate a trajectory of π. The following
high-level algorithm is suggested in Frey and Schmidt (2012).
(1) Generate a trajectory of the Markov chain X.
(2) Generate for the trajectory of X constructed in (i) a trajectory of the default
indicator H and the noisy information Z.
(3) Solve the system of SDEs numerically, for instance via a Euler-Maruyama type
method.
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We close this section with a theoretical result on the relation of the un-
collateralized CCVA in the two versions of the model.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the CDS contract is un-collateralized, i.e. Ct ≡ 0.
Then the following relationships hold:
CCVAO0 ≥ CCVAU0 and CDVAO0 ≥ CDVAU0 .
Proof. We begin with the CCVA. We get, using the definition of the CCVA for the
case without collateralization, Jensen’s inequality and the relation PUτ = E(POτ |
FUτ ) that
CCVAO0 = LGDS E
(
1{t<τ<T}1{ξ=S}
(
POτ
)+)
= LGDS E
(
1{t<τ<T}1{ξ=S}E
((
POτ
)+∣∣∣FUτ ))
≥ LGDS E
(
1{t<τ<T}1{ξ=S}
(
E
(
POτ
∣∣FUτ ))+)
= LGDS E
(
1{t<τ<T}1{ξ=S}(PUτ )
+
)
,
and the last line is obviously equal to CCVAU0 . A similar reasoning applies to the
CDVA.
The overall relation of the BCCVA in the two model variants is in general
unclear, since the BCCVA is the difference of the CCVA and CDVA. In the special
case where B is of a much higher credit quality than S the CDVA is almost zero and
we have the relation BCCVAO ≥ BCCVAU . Similarly, if S is of a much higher credit
quality than B one has BCCVAO ≤ BCCVAU (always for the un-collateralized
case).
5. Collateralization strategies
Standard collateralization strategies. We consider among others the following
collateralization strategies. No collateralization corresponds to the strategy Ct ≡ 0.
The threshold-collaterization with initial margin γ and thresholds M1, M2 ≥ 0,
labeled Cγ,M1,M2 is given by
Cγ,M1,M2t := γ + (Pt −M1)1{Pt−>M1} + (Pt +M2)1{Pt<−M2} ∀t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ).
This strategy is used if B and S want to protect themselves against severe losses,
while accepting the possibility of small losses in order to simplify the collateraliza-
tion process. At the beginning of the contract an initial payment of collateral of the
size of γ takes place that can be used as a crude device to account for contagion ef-
fects. Additional collateral is only posted if the exposure of one entity exceeds some
threshold (M1 in case of B andM2 in case of S). Threshold collateralization is quite
popular in practice, see Gregory (2010). However, the choice of γ in practice is often
based on rules of thumb (compare ICMAs European Repo Council (2012) for Re-
pos), possibly reducing the effectiveness of this strategy. For γ =M1 =M2 = 0 we
obtain the special case of market-value collateralization Cmarket with Cmarkett = Pt.
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Refined collateralization strategies. In the following we propose refined collat-
eralization strategies that attempt to reduce the overall counterparty-risk exposure
of the contracting parties. We use the CCVA to measure the exposure to coun-
terparty risk of B and the CDVA to measure the exposure of S. B and S have
obviously conflicting interests: B prefers a collateralization strategy where S posts
a large amount of collateral and B posts no collateral and vice versa for B. In order
to balance these conflicting interests we propose to choose the ‘optimal’ collateral-
ization strategy as a minimizer of the function
m(C) := CCVA0+CDVA0 (5.1)
= E
(
1{τ<T}1{ξ=S}D(t, τ)(LGDS(P+τ − C+τ−)+ + LGD′S(C−τ− − P−τ )+)
)
(5.2)
+ E
(
1{τ<T}1{ξ=B}D(t, τ)(LGDB(C
−
τ− − P−τ )− + LGD′B(P+τ − C+τ−)−)
)
(5.3)
over all F adapted collateralization strategies C. In the full-information case we let
F = FO and thus Pτ = POτ ; in the incomplete-information case we let F = FU and
Pτ = P
U
τ .
The analysis of the full-information model is straightforward. In that case the
market value (POt )t≥0 is continuous at τB respectively at τS . Therefore counterparty
risk can be eliminated completely by choosing the market-value strategy Cmarkett =
POt = p
O(t,Xt), t < τ , that is m(C
market) = 0. The situation is more involved
in the incomplete-information model. In that case the jump of π at τ leads to a
jump in the market value PUt of the CDS at t = τ and the collateral position
cannot be adjusted at that point. Hence one has for the market value strategy
Cmarkett = P
U
t = p
U (t, πt), t < τ that m(C
market) > 0.
We therefore try to find an alternative optimal strategy under incomplete in-
formation. As a first step we simplify the function m by conditioning on Fτ−. It is
well-known that τ is Fτ− measurable and that for any predictable process L the
random variable Lτ is Fτ− measurable; see Protter (2005), Sec III.2. Moreover, one
has for j ∈ {R,B, S} that
Q (ξ = j|Fτ−) = (λ̂j)τ−∑
i∈{B,R,S}(λ̂i)τ−
=: dj(πτ−) (5.4)
We begin with the CCVA component of m. By conditioning on Fτ− we get that
(5.2) equals
E
(
1{τ≤T}D(t, τ)E
(
1{ξ=S}
(
LGDS(P
+
τ − C+τ−)+ + LGD′S(C−τ− − P−τ )+
)∣∣Fτ−))
(5.5)
In the sequel we use the notation
xS := xS(τ, πτ−) = pU
(
τ, πτ− + diag
(
γ1S , . . . , γ
K
S
)
πτ−
)
(5.6)
to denote the price of the CDS immediately after the default of S; similarly, xB :=
xB(τ, πτ−) denotes the price of the CDS immediately after the default of B. Now
note that 1{ξ=S}P+τ = x
+
S . Hence, using (5.4), the inner conditional expectation in
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(5.5) is given by
(
LGDS(x
+
S − C+τ−)+ + LGD
′
S(C
−
τ− − x−S )+
)
dS , and (5.5) equals
E
(
1{τ≤T}D(t, τ)
(
LGDS(x
+
S − C+τ−)+ + LGD
′
S(C
−
τ− − x−S )+
)
dS
)
.
Similarly we get that (5.3), the CDVA component of m, is equal to
E
(
D(t, τ)(LGDB(C
−
τ− − x−B)− + LGD′B(x+B − C+τ−)−)dB
)
.
Define now the ‘infinitesimal loss function’
l(t, π, c) =
(
LGDS(xS(t, π)
+ − c+)+) + LGD′S(c− − xS(t, π)−)+
)
dS(π)
+
(
LGDB(c
− − xB(t, π)−)− + LGD′B(xB(t, π)+ − c+)−
)
dB(π) .
The above computations show that m can be written in the form m(C) =
E (D(t, τ)l(τ, πτ−, Cτ−)) . Suppose now that we find an FU -adapted RCLL-process
C∗ such that a.s.
C∗t (ω) ∈ argmin{l(t, πt(ω), c) : c ∈ R} .
Then C∗ is an optimal collateralization strategy - a minimizer of m(·) - in the
incomplete-information model. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Denote by xS = xS(πt) and xB = xB(πt) the risk-free CDS
price at time t given τ = t, ξ = S respectively τ = t, ξ = B (see (5.6)) and let
dS = dS(πt) =
(λ̂S)t∑
i∈{B,R,S}(λ̂i)t
and similarly for dB. Consider an FU -adapted RCLL
process C∗. C∗ is a minimizer of the function m under incomplete information if
and only if the following relations hold Q-a.s. for t < τ :
C∗t =

xS if 0 ≤ xB ≤ xS , LGD′BdB < LGDSdS
xB if 0 ≤ xB ≤ xS , LGD′BdB > LGDSdS
xS if xB ≤ xS ≤ 0, LGDBdB < LGD′SdS
xB if xB ≤ xS ≤ 0, LGD′BdB > LGDSdS
argmin{l(τ, πt, c) : c = xB , 0, xS} if xB < 0 < xS
C∗t ∈

[xB , xS ] if 0 ≤ xB ≤ xS , LGD′BdB = LGDSdS
[xB , xS ] if xB ≤ xS ≤ 0, LGDBdB = LGD′SdS
[xS , xB ] if xS ≤ xB .
In particular we have l(t, π, Ct) = 0 for x
S ≤ xB. Moreover, it holds that always
C∗t ∈ [min{xS , xB},max{xS , xB}].
Proof. The proof mainly relies on the preceding arguments. In order to find an
optimal strategy we have to minimize the function c 7→ l(τ, π, c). This is a piecewise
linear function, which converges to ∞ for c → ±∞ and fixed t, π. Therefore a
minimum exists that can be found by a case-by-case analysis. Here we will only
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discuss the case 0 < xB < xS . The other cases can be treated in a similar manner.
If 0 < xB < xS , l becomes:
l(t, π, c) = (LGDS(xS − c+)+ + LGD′S c−)dS + (LGD′B(xB − c+)−)dB
In this case l is decreasing in the interval (−∞, xB ] and increasing in [xS ,∞).
Therefore the optimal c lies in [xB , xS ]. For c ∈ [xB , xS ], l is given by:
l(τ, πτ−, c) = c(LGD′BdB − LGDSdS) + LGDSxSdS − LGD′BxBdB .
Therefore the result follows. The other claims can be established by a similar case-
by-case analysis.
Comments. We will see below that this strategy performs well even under incom-
plete information. However, if Q(xB(πt) > xS(πt)) > 0 there remains some risk,
that is m(C∗) > 0. This remaining risk is due to the fact that in an inhomoge-
neous portfolio the size of the contagion effects at τ depends on the identity of the
defaulting firm which cannot be predicted given the information contained in Fτ−.
Note that the refined strategy depends on dB , dS , and, most importantly, on the
market value xS and xB of the risk-free CDS after the default of S or B and hence on
the size of contagion effects. While these quantities can be easily computed within
a given calibrated reduced-form credit risk model with contagion such as the model
of Frey and Schmidt (2012) used here, they do depend on the specific form of the
model. In order to obtain a ‘model-independent’ version of C∗ one could start from
some ad-hoc assumption on the size of contagion effects, based perhaps on historical
data analysis and on the qualitative insights that derive from Equation (4.1); dS
and dB could be estimated by dS = SS/(SB + SS + SR), dB = SB/(SB + SS + SR)
where SB , SR and SS the fair CDS spread for B, R and S observed on the market.
6. Numerical Experiments
In this section we discuss the results of a number of numerical experiments.
6.1. Setup and Calibration
We consider a Markov chain X with K = 8 states. We assume that X exhibits
next-neighbor dynamics, so that only the values on the main diagonal and on the
first off-diagonal of the generator matrix W may be different from zero. For our
simulations we set the entries on the off-diagonal equal to 0.25, which means that
the Markov chain jumps on average 2 times per year. We put the short-rate equal to
r = 0.015. Throughout the study we assume that RecB = RecS = RecR = 0.5 and
Rec′B = Rec
′
S = 0.75. Qualitative results of the simulation study did not change,
when other parameters were used.
We calibrate the model to given risk-free CDS spreads and default correlations
for R, B and S. We consider five different scenarios, labeled Base; Base 2; Symmet-
ric; Risky protection buyer; Risky protection seller. These scenarios differ mainly
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with respect to the relative riskiness of the firms involved in the CDS contract;
their choice serves to illustrate the impact of the relative riskiness of the differ-
ent firms on credit value adjustments. The fair CDS spreads (in basis points) and
default correlations (in percent) corresponding to these scenarios can be found in
Table 6.1.
Table 1. Risk scenarios: CDS-spreads are given in base points, de-
fault correlations in percentage points
Name of scenario B R S ρBR ρBS ρRS
Base 50 1000 500 2.0 1.5 5.0
Base2 500 1000 50 5.0 1.5 2.0
Symmetric 500 1000 500 5.0 3.0 5.0
Risky PB 1000 500 50 5.0 2.0 1.5
Risky PS 50 500 1000 1.5 2.0 5.0
In this context model model calibration amounts to finding the initial distribu-
tion of the Markov chain π0 and the parameters λB , λR, λS . For calibration purposes
we use a modification of the algorithm presented in Frey and Schmidt (2012); since
the focus of this paper is not on model calibration we omit the details. All in all
the calibration procedure performed well, with very small errors for CDS spreads
(absolute errors are less than 0.5 bp) and acceptable results for default correlations
(relative errors are around 3%). The calibrated values of π0 and of λB , λR and
λS can be found in the appendix, Table 2. Note in particular that the calibrated
functions λB(·), λS(·) and λR(·) are increasing in x. In the incomplete-information
model we moreover need to choose the parameters a(1), . . . , a(K). We took a = c∗b,
where b = [−1.75,−1.25,−0.75,−0.25, 0.25, 0.75, 1.25, 1.75] and where c ≥ 0 If not
mentioned otherwise, c is taken equal to one.
6.2. Results
No collateralization
The main findings regarding the qualitative behavior of the CCVA and CDVA in
the case of no collateralization can be summarized as follows.
a) The size of the credit value adjustments depends largely on the relative
riskiness of the firms. In particular, the un-collateralized CCVA is comparatively
high if the first-to-default probability Q(τ ≤ T, ξ = S) is relatively large; similarly,
the un-collateralized CDVA is comparatively high if Q(τ ≤ T, ξ = B) is relatively
large. This can be seen by comparing the size of the value adjustments for the Base
and Base2 scenarios or the RiskyPB and the RiskyPS scenarios in Tables 5 and 6:
as shown in Table 4, Q(τ ≤ T, ξ = S) is relatively large in the Base and the RiskyPS
scenarios, leading to a high CCVA; similarly, Q(τ ≤ T, ξ = B) is relatively large
in the Base2 and the RiskyPB scenarios, leading to a high CDVA. Note that the
first-to-default probabilities are identical in both versions of the model. They are
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largely driven by the (relative) riskiness of the three firms as given by the risk-free
CDS spread in the three scenarios.
b) Without collateralization we have CCVAU < CCVAO and CDVAU <
CCVAO, as predicted by Proposition 4.2. The differences between the model vari-
ants decreases with decreasing observation noise, that is for higher values of the
parameter c in the definition of the function a, as can be seen by inspection of
Table 7.
c) In both versions of the model there is clear evidence for so-called wrong-way
risk : the conditional default probability of the reference entity given an early default
of the protection seller is much higher than the unconditional default probability
of R. In the full-information case this can be seen from Table 3 which gives the
distribution of Xτ for the case ξ = B and ξ = S. Clearly,the Markov chain tends
to be in a higher state (compare the high probabilities for x8) at a default. Hence
prices of CDS at τ tend to be high too. Figure 1 shows that the behavior of Xτ
is passed onto πτ in the sense that π
j
τ has rather small realizations if j is small
and high realizations if j is high. This is confirmed by the shapes of the empirical
distributions of π1 and π8 (recall that π1 respectively π8 gives the conditional prob-
ability of being in a good state (low default intensities) respectively in a bad state
(high default intensities). ) Findings b) and c) show that while event correlations
and wrong way risk are more crucial for determining un-collateralized credit value
adjustments, contagion effects per se are not so important (but they will matter
for the performance of collateralization strategies). The possibility to distinguish
between event correlation and default contagion is thus clearly an advantage of our
setting.
Collateralization
We go on with the analysis of various collateralization strategies. Since collateral-
ization is only relevant on paths where τ < T and where ξ ∈ {B,S}, we illustrate
the performance of collateralization strategies by plotting the conditional empirical
distribution function of the following random variables:
LB(C) := 1{ξ=S}
(
LGDS(P
+
τ − C+τ−)+ + LGD′S(C−τ− − P−τ )+
)
.
LS(C) := D(t, τ)1{ξ=B}
(
LGDB(C
−
τ− − P−τ )− + LGD′B(P+τ )− − C+τ−
)
.
given that {τ ≤ T, ξ ∈ {B,S}}. Note that LB(C) gives discounted loss to B that
arises from an early default of S, whereas LS(C) gives the discounted loss to S that
arises from an early default of B.
We analyze strategies of the following type:
• Threshold-collateralization with initial margin γ and thresholds M1 = M2 :=
M , denoted Cγ,M ;
• Market collateralization Cmarket = C0,0 in the full-information model;
• The strategy C∗ derived in Proposition 5.1 for the incomplete-information
model.
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Our findings can be summarized as follows:
a) Threshold collateralization with γ = 0 is very effective in the complete-
information model. For a threshold M > 0 counterparty risk is largely reduced as
can be seen from Table 8. Counterparty credit risk even vanishes completely for
M = 0. Moreover, losses are bounded when threshold-collateralization is used. This
can be seen from Figure 2 which displays the empirical cdf of LB given τ ≤ T and
ξ ∈ {B,S} in the complete information model for different scenarios.
b) Under incomplete information the performance of threshold collateralization
with γ = 0 and threshold M is not fully satisfactory. The main reason is the
fact that because of the contagion effects threshold collateralization systematically
underestimates the market value of the CDS at τ which leads to losses for the
protection buyer in case that ξ = S. As a consequence we observe high values
for the CCVA in scenarios such as the Base scenario where Q(τ ≤ T, ξ = S) is
comparatively high, compare Table 9. The losses of the protection seller on the
other hand are always smaller than the threshold M . This behavior can be seen
from Figures 3 and 4 where the conditional cdf of LB and LS is plotted in various
scenarios.
A nonzero initial margin γ can improve the performance of threshold collater-
alization in scenarios where the credit quality of B is much better than the credit
quality of S as in the Base scenario. In that case Q(ξ = S | τ ≤ T, ξ ∈ {B,S})
is close to one and one essentially knows that ξ = S in case of an early default.
Consequently it is possible to hedge a large part of the contagion effects by choosing
a positive initial margin γ. This can be seen from Figure 6 where m(Cγ,M ) is plot-
ted in the Base scenario for various values of γ and M . In a symmetrical scenario
where B and S have similar credit quality on the other hand, the identity of the
first defaulting firm cannot be predicted and choosing a nonzero initial margin does
not help much to improve the effectiveness of threshold collateralization, as can be
seen from Figure 7. This is clear intuitively: a large initial margin γ > 0 will lead to
a loss for S in case that ξ = B because of re-hypothecation; on the other hand for
γ ≤ 0 there will be a loss for B in case that ξ = S because of contagion effects, and
neither of the two cases can be ‘ruled out’ a-priori because B and S have similar
credit quality.
c) The refined strategy C∗ on the other hand performs well under incomplete
information and reduces counterparty risk substantially as can be seen from Ta-
ble 10 where various credit value adjustments and the value of m(C) are given. The
strategy is particularly effective in scenarios where the credit quality of B is higher
than the credit quality of S so that xS ≤ xB such as the Base scenario and the
Risky-PS scenario. In particular the refined strategy leads to a value of m(C∗) = 0
(complete elimination of counterparty risk) in the symmetric scenario case where
threshold collateralization did not perform particularly well. On the other hand C∗
does not fully eliminate counterparty risk in scenarios where the credit quality of S
is worse than the credit quality of B such as the Base2 and the Risky-PB scenario,
as is evident from Table 10 and Figures 8 and 9). However, even in these scenarios
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the probability that some party suffers a large loss is fairly small.
Of course, the superior performance of the refined collateralization strategy is
related to the fact that in our framework the quantities xB and xS are known
exactly. In real markets on the other hand the size of contagion effects cannot be
predicted exactly so that the practical implementation of this strategy is subject
to a certain degree of model risk. Nonetheless our simulations show that refined
collateralization strategies that account for contagion effects have the potential
to reduce counterparty credit risk significantly in scenarios where there is a non-
negligible probability that the protection seller defaults first.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 4.1) By symmetry, it suffices to consider the case i = B.
a) The default time τB is the time, at which the Markov chain (X,H
B) first
enters the absorbing set A = {(1, 1), . . . , (K, 1)} and leaves the set Ac :=
{(1, 0), . . . , (K, 0)}. Hence we get:
Q
(
τB > s
∣∣Xt = k,HBt = 0) = Q ((Xs, HBs ) ∈ Ac∣∣Xt = k,HBt = 0)
= 1{τB>t}(e
⊤
k , 0)e
Q(s−t)(1⊤K , 0)
⊤
Here Q denotes the generator of (X,HB). Qn is of the form:
Qn =
(
W − ΛB ΛB
0 W
)n
=
(
(W − ΛB)n ∗
0 ∗
)
=
(
QnB ∗
0 ∗
)
.
Therefore the entries in the upper left part of the matrix exponential eQ(s−t) are
given by eQB(t−s) and we can conclude:
Q
(
τB > s
∣∣Xt = k,HBt = 0) = 1{τB>t}e⊤k eQB(s−t)1K .
b) The default times are conditionally independent doubly stochastic random times,
and hence the first-to-default time exhibits an intensity, which is given by the sum
of the individual intensities (see McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005), Lemma 9.36)
and the result follows from a).
c) We consider the Markov chain Ψt = (X,H
B , HR, HS)τ∧t (the chain stopped
at the first default time. Ignoring the states where more than one company defaults
a(and which can therefore never be reached by Ψ), the infinitesimal generator of Ψ
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is given by:
Q¯ =
(
W −∑j∈{B,R,S} Λj ΛB ΛR ΛS
0 0 0 0
)
.
The protection buyer B defaults first and before time s if and only if the stopped
Markov chain Ψ is in the set A˜ := {(1, 1, 0, 0), . . . , (K, 1, 0, 0)} at time s. Therefore:
Q (τ ≤ s, ξ = B|Xt = k,Ht = (0, 0, 0)) = Q
(
Ψs ∈ A˜
∣∣∣Ψt = (k, 0, 0, 0))
= 1{τ>t}(e⊤k , 0)e
Q¯(s−t)(0,1⊤K , 0, 0)
⊤.
So we have to compute the entries of a submatrix of the matrix exponential eQ¯(s−t).
Since the n-th power of the matrix Q¯(s− t) is given by (n > 0):
(Q¯(s− t))n = (s− t)n
(
Qn(1) Q
n−1
(1) ΛB Q
n−1
(1) ΛR Q
n−1
(1) ΛS
0 0 0 0
)
the relevant submatrix is given by
∞∑
n=1
Qn−1B
n!
(s− t)nΛB = Q−1(1)
( ∞∑
n=0
Qn−1(1)
n!
(s− t)n − I
)
ΛB
= Q−1(1)
(
eQ(1)(s−t) − I
)
ΛB ,
and the claim follows.
d) The result follows from similar considerations as in c).
Proof. (Proof of Corollary 4.1) The conditional distribution of τ given Xt = k and
τi > t exhibits the density u 7→ −1{τi>t}e⊤k QieQi(u−t)1K . Therefore, value of the
default leg is given by
E
(
LGDR 1{t<τR≤T}D(t, τR)
∣∣FOt ) = ∫ T
t
−LGDRD(t, u)e⊤k QReQR(u−t)1Kdu
= −LGDR e⊤k QR
∫ T
t
e(QR−rI)(u−t)du1K
= −LGDR e⊤k QR
[
(QR − rI)−1e(QR−rI)(u−t)
]u=T
u=t
1K
= −LGDR e⊤k QR(QR − rI)−1
[
e(QR−rI)(T−t) − I
]
1K .
Furthermore we get for the premium leg:
E
(∫ T
t
SD(t, u)1{τR>u}du
∣∣∣∣∣FOt
)
=
∫ T
t
SD(t, u)E
(
1{τR>u}
∣∣FOt ) du
=
∫ T
t
Se⊤k e
(QR−rI)(u−t)1Kdu
= Se⊤k (QR − rI)−1
[
e(QR−rI)(u−t)
]u=T
u=t
1K
= Se⊤k (QR − rI)−1
[
e(QR−rI)(T−t) − I
]
1K .
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Appendix B. Figures and Tables
Table 2. Results of model calibration for the base scenario
state x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
pi0 0.0810 0.0000 0.2831 0.0548 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5811
λB 0.0000 0.0010 0.0027 0.0040 0.0050 0.0059 0.0091 0.0195
λR 0.0031 0.0669 0.1187 0.1482 0.1687 0.1855 0.2393 0.3668
λS 0.0007 0.0245 0.0482 0.0627 0.0732 0.0818 0.1108 0.1840
Table 3. Distribution of the Markov chain at τ in the base scenario for ξ = B and
ξ = S.
state x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
ξ = B 0.0001 0.0144 0.0740 0.0500 0.0208 0.0221 0.0982 0.7203
ξ = S 0.0011 0.0309 0.1188 0.0713 0.0277 0.0279 0.1074 0.6149
Table 4. The first-to-default probabilities for
different scenarios
scenario B R S
Base 0.0293 0.4238 0.2463
Base2 0.2463 0.4238 0.0293
Symmetric 0.1851 0.3972 0.1851
RiskyPB 0.4238 0.2463 0.0293
RiskyPS 0.0293 0.2463 0.4263
Table 5. Valuation adjustments for the
complete-information model without collater-
alization
scenario CCVA CDVA BCCVA
Base 94 1 92
Base2 10 26 -16
Symmetric 74 5 68
RiskyPB 6 45 -39
RiskyPS 115 1 114
Table 6. Valuation adjustments for the
incomplete-information model without collat-
eralization
scenario CCVA CDVA BCCVA
Base 83 1 82
Base2 9 15 -6
Symmetric 72 4 68
RiskyPB 6 27 -21
RiskyPS 97 1 96
Table 7. Valuation adjustments under incomplete
information for different values of the parameter c
(low values of c correspond to a high observation
noise) in the base scenario
noise parameter CCVA CDVA BCCVA
c = 0 68 0 68
c = 1 83 1 82
c = 2 89 1 88
c = 5 92 1 90
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Table 8. Valuation adjustments in the
complete-information model with threshold-
collateralization with γ = 0 in the Base sce-
nario
threshold CCVA CDVA BCCVA
M = 0 0 0 0
M = 0.02 16 0 15
M = 0.05 38 1 37
no coll 93 1 92
Table 9. Valuation adjust-
ments in the incomplete-information model
with threshold-collateralization with γ = 0
in Base-scenario
threshold CCVA CDVA BCCVA
M = 0 35 0 35
M = 0.02 45 0 45
M = 0.05 60 0 60
no coll 83 1 82
Table 10. Valuation adjustments in the incomplete-information model with
refined collateralization strategy C∗. Note that m(C∗) is small in all sce-
narios and that m(C∗) = 0 in the Base- and RiskyPS scenarios where
xS ≤ xB .
scenario CCVA CDVA BCCVA m(C∗) = CCVA+CDVA
Base 0 0 0 0
Base2 1 3 -2 4
Symmetric 0 0 0 0
RiskyPB 1 5 -5 6
RiskyPS 0 0 0 0
Fig. 1. Empirical cdf of piτ in the Base scenario given τ ≤ T and ξ = S. Note that
pi8τ (the probability attributed to the worst state) tends to be large.
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Fig. 2. Empirical cdf of LB for different threshold-collateralization strategies with
γ = 0 in the Base scenario in the complete-information model given τ ≤ T
and ξ ∈ {B,S}. Note that without collateralization the probability that LB is
large is quite high since in the base scenario Q(ξ = S | τ ≤ T, ξ ∈ {B,S}) =
0.245/(0.245+0.029) ≈ 1 (see Table 4). We can see that threshold collateralization
reduces counterparty credit risk very effectively in that case.
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Fig. 3. Empirical cdf of LB for different threshold-collateralization strategies with
γ = 0 in the Base scenario in the incomplete-information model given τ ≤ T and
ξ ∈ {B,S}. In that case threshold collateralization with γ = 0 is not very effective:
even for M = 0 there is roughly a 20% probability that LB exceeds 300bp.
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Fig. 4. Empirical cdf of LS using threshold-collateralization for the Base2 scenario
in the incomplete-information model given τ ≤ T and ξ ∈ {B,S}. In this scenario
Q(ξ = B | τ ≤ T, ξ ∈ {B,S}) is close to one so that threshold collateralization is
quite effective even under incomplete information.
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of the fair CDS spread in the complete and incomplete infor-
mation model.
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Fig. 6. Graph of m(Cγ,M ) (sum of CCVA and CDVA) under incomplete information for the
threshold strategy Cγ,M for varying values of the initial margin γ and the thresholdM in the
Base scenario. The function m(Cγ,M ) is minimal for M = 0 and a positive initial threshold
γ∗ ≈ 0.12 leading to an optimal value m(Cγ∗,0) = 3bp, so that counterparty risk can in effect
be mitigated by a proper choice of the initial margin.
Fig. 7. Graph of m(Cγ,M ) (sum of CCVA and CDVA) under incomplete information for the
threshold strategy Cγ,M for varying values of the initial margin γ and the thresholdM in the
symmetric scenario. The functionm(Cγ,M ) is minimal forM = 0 and a small initial threshold
γ∗ ≈ 0.01. Note that m(Cγ∗,0) = 15bp whereas for the refined strategy from Proposition 5.1
one has m(C∗) = 0.
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Fig. 8. Empirical cdf of LB given τ ≤ T and ξ ∈ {B,S} under incomplete informa-
tion for the refined strategy in various scenarios. Note that in the Base, Symmetric
and the RiskyPS scenario LB = 0 a.s., that is counterparty risk for B is eliminated
completely by the strategy. In the other scenarios some small degree of counterparty
risk remains.
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Fig. 9. Empirical cdf of LS given τ ≤ T and ξ ∈ {B,S} under incomplete informa-
tion for the refined strategy in various scenarios. Note that in the Base, Symmetric
and the RiskyPS scenario LS = 0 a.s., that is counterparty risk for S is eliminated
completely by the strategy. In the other scenarios some small degree of counterparty
risk remains.
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